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FROM ACES TO FETAL TRAUMA: HOW SLIPPERY IS THE SLOPE 
OF DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING FACTORS? 
Avi Muller* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
We often ignore sentencings.  Television shows and movies with 
trials end with either an acquittal or a finding of guilt.  In the latter 
instance, the viewer seldom glimpses what comes after—the 
sentencing.  For defendants, however, this is one of the most important 
days in their lives.  For judges, it is one of the most essential functions 
they serve, and the processes by which it plays out are crucial.  After all, 
a sentencing often results in the removal of a defendant’s liberty. 
Scholars and judges argue whether sentencing should be a strict 
process governed by bright-line rules or a more fluid, human process in 
the hands of each judge.1  Within the latter system, a major sub-issue is 
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 1 See generally Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing After Booker, 48 CRIME & JUST. 137 
(2019); Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy 
Nullification” and Other Surreal Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2011); Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court has 
Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 
(2010); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in 
Federal Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591 (2009); Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and 
Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009); David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After 
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what judges should and should not consider in imposing a sentence.  
Some factors do not even pose a question; for example, we would not 
want judges to consider a defendant’s clothing in determining whether 
and how long to imprison a defendant.  But it is generally accepted that 
a judge should be able to consider a defendant’s remorse and acceptance 
of responsibility.2  This conversation implicates questions related to the 
goals of sentencing—rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
retribution3—as well as philosophical questions of free will, culpability, 
and determinism.  
These questions become even more complicated with the 
introduction of science.  Science and law have a complicated 
relationship.  Lawyers often try to introduce scientific research into the 
legal process with mixed results.4  But “scientists do not assert that they 
know what is immutably ‘true’—they are committed to searching for 
new, temporary, theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena.”5  
Much of this scientific evidence comes in as part of the criminal 
adjudication process.  Although much of it is used during trial—e.g., DNA 
evidence to prove identity; diagnoses to support an insanity defense—it 
has also been used to support an increase or decrease in a defendant’s 
sentence—e.g., mental illness to preclude the imposition of the death 
sentence.6   
Accepting the current system as it is—a system with advisory rules 
that leaves some discretion with the judge7—this Comment examines 
how judges use scientific evidence at sentencing and argues whether 
and to what extent judges should consider a defendant’s experience of 
fetal trauma.8  While sentencing schemes differ from state to state, this 
Comment will focus on the federal sentencing system.  Part II of this 
Comment will discuss the history of sentencing in the United States and 
examine the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) and how 
they work today.  Part III details the role of behavioral science research 
 
Apprendi, Blakely and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163 (2005); Myron H. Thompson, Opinion, 
Sentencing and Sensibility, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/
01/21/opinion/sentencing-and-sensibility.html. 
 2 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3E1.1, 5K2.16 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 
2018) [hereinafter USSG]. 
 3 FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 3 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 2018) [hereinafter THE 
BASICS]. 
 4 See infra Part III. 
 5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (quoting Brief for 
Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. as Amici Curiae 9). 
 6 See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
 7 See infra Section II.B. 
 8 That is, trauma experienced by the defendant’s mother while the defendant is in 
utero. 
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in the legal system in general and at sentencing.  Specifically, it will 
analyze the research on Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) and 
criminal behavior and examine how judges use ACEs at sentencing.  Part 
IV discusses the current research on fetal trauma and how, if at all, it 
connects fetal traumatic experience to criminal behavior.  Finally, Part 
V applies the research on fetal trauma to the current sentencing scheme 
and compares this to the research and use of ACEs to argue whether 
judges should be considering fetal trauma to the same extent or even at 
all.  In sum, this Comment will argue that judges, although perhaps 
justified in their exercise of discretion at sentencing, should stop short 
of considering a defendant’s traumatic experience while in utero. 
II.  UNITED STATES V. BOOKER AND DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING 
The United States has a long and complicated history with 
sentencing.  Over the last two and a half centuries, we have bounced 
around from nearly unlimited discretion in sentencing to a system that 
restricted judges’ ability to consider certain factors to a system that is 
now somewhere in between.9  This Part begins with a brief history of 
sentencing in the United States and its evolution into the system we use 
today.  It then discusses the Guidelines, how judges use them, and the 
impact they have on sentences.  Although this Part will recognize the 
various arguments and principles behind both the more discretionary 
and more limited systems, the answer to which is superior is beyond the 
scope of this Comment.  This Comment accepts the current scheme and 
applies its principles to evidence of fetal trauma. 
A.  A Brief History of Sentencing 
Even those outside the legal world recognize the phrase “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  This is the burden of proof the prosecutor bears in 
a criminal case.10  Any evidence that a prosecutor puts forth to satisfy 
this burden, and establish a defendant’s guilt, is strictly regulated by the 
rules of evidence “to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just 
determination.”11  For example, hearsay12 is not admissible at trial 
unless it falls into an exception provided by the rules or other federal 
 
 9 See infra Section II.A. 
 10 MARC L. MILLER ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURES PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION: CASES, 
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 467 (Wolters Kluwer Legal, 6th ed. 2019). 
 11 FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 12 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement “offer[ed] in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted in the statement.”  FED. R. EVID. 801(c).  To illustrate, when proving 
the color of a traffic light at the time of an accident, it would be inadmissible hearsay for 
a witness to testify that “my friend saw the accident and told me ‘the light was green for 
Driver A.’” 
MULLER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2021  1:42 PM 
1392 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1389 
statutes.13  The Constitution also governs the admissibility of evidence 
at trial.  For example, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
provides a defendant with a right to confront any witness brought to 
testify against him.14  This ensures a fair adversarial process and 
protects defendants from unreliable testimony by allowing them to 
challenge any testimony offered against them.15  These protections, 
however, apply to evidence admitted at trial to prove a defendant’s 
guilt.16   
In contrast, sentencing judges historically exercised “wide 
discretion in the sources and types of evidence used . . . in determining 
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed.”17  Sentencing judges 
even used hearsay, which is presumptively not allowed to prove a 
defendant’s guilt,18 in determining an appropriate sentence.19  During 
this time, limitations on sentencing consisted of federal statutes setting 
a maximum fine or term of years and “permitting the sentencing judge 
to impose any term of imprisonment and any fine up to the statutory 
maximums.”20  The two primary guiding principles of this indeterminate 
sentencing system were rehabilitation21 and individualism.22  
As with many well-intentioned practices, this system had 
unintended consequences.23  Bipartisan criticism of indeterminate 
sentencing peaked in the 1960s and 1970s due to increased crime rates, 
high recidivism, and sentencing disparities by class and race.24  After 
concluding that rehabilitation should be de-emphasized and that 
individualized sentences led to unwarranted sentencing disparities, 
reformers proceeded in two directions: they passed laws with 
mandatory penalty schemes (such as mandatory minimums for 
 
 13 FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 14 U.S. CONST amend. VI. 
 15 See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 16 While there are Constitutional limitations on information offered at sentencing in 
a few special situations, the bulk of regulation is on evidence at trial.  See infra Section 
II.A. 
 17 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (noting this system was in place 
“since the American colonies became a nation”). 
 18 See FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 19 Williams, 337 U.S. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that much of what the 
sentencing judge used to decide the proper sentence would have been inadmissible at 
trial as hearsay). 
 20 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993). 
 21 Id. at 240; see also Bowman, supra note 1, at 370. 
 22 Bowman, supra note 1, at 370; see also Williams 337 U.S. at 247 (“[T]he 
punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.”). 
 23 Yellen, supra note 1, at 165. 
 24 Yellen, supra note 1, at 165–66. 
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narcotics and weapons offenses) and established the Guidelines through 
the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act.25  This complex set of federal 
sentencing guidelines “severely restrict[ed] the ability of judges to 
consider individual offender characteristics.”26  Despite these restrictive 
guidelines, Supreme Court jurisprudence was still hands-off with 
regards to procedural and substantive fairness in sentencing.27  Until 
2000, any facts introduced at sentencing “did not need to be determined 
by more than a preponderance of the evidence.”28 
Beginning in 2000, with Apprendi v. New Jersey,29 the Court began 
to impose greater limits on fact-finding at sentencing.30  In Apprendi, the 
Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”31  Two years later, the Court held 
that if a state statute provides for an increase in punishment that is 
contingent on a finding of fact, “that fact—no matter how the State labels 
it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”32  This played 
out in 2004 when the Court hinted at the future advisory nature of the 
Guidelines with its decisions in Blakely v. Washington.33  The sentencing 
judge, applying the procedures in Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act, 
imposed a punishment that exceeded the statutory range after finding 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with 
“deliberate cruelty.”34  Although “deliberate cruelty” was not a factor 
listed in the statute,35 state law authorized an increase above the 
 
 25 Yellen, supra note 1, at 166–67. 
 26 Yellen, supra note 1, at 168. 
 27 Id. (noting that the Court was “both highly deferential to legislative choices and 
very tolerant of procedural informality”); see also Williams 337 U.S. at 245 (holding that 
a “sentencing judge may consider such information even though obtained outside the 
courtroom from persons whom a defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-
examine”). 
 28 Yellen, supra note 1, at 168. 
 29 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 30 These limits were alluded to in Justice Murphy’s dissent in Williams.  Williams, 
337 U.S. at 253 (Murphy, J. dissenting) (“[A judge] should be willing to increase” a jury 
prescribed penalty of life to a penalty of death “only with the most scrupulous regard 
for the rights of the defendant.”). 
 31 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (invalidating a New Jersey statute that allowed judges 
to increase an already established statutory maximum penalty if the judge found by a 
preponderance of the evidence a motivation of racial animus). 
 32 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 586 (2002). 
 33 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 34 Id. at 299–301. 
 35 Conversely, the factors in Apprendi (racial animus as part of a “hate crime” law) 
and Ring (“aggravating factors” set forth by Arizona law) were explicitly required by 
state law.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–69; Ring, 536 U.S. at 588. 
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statutory maximum after a finding of a “substantial and compelling 
reason.”36  The Court, however, held that the state’s sentencing 
procedure violated the Sixth Amendment and invalidated the 
defendant’s sentence.37  
This seemed to contradict the Guidelines—which allowed for 
similar upward departures—and ultimately set the stage for the Court’s 
inevitable decision to nullify their mandatory nature.38  Like the 
Washington guidelines, the federal guidelines mandated increases to 
sentencing ranges based on facts that did not need to be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.39  Soon after Blakely, these mandates led to the 
Court’s holding in Booker that the Guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment.40  In fashioning a remedy, the Court struck the provisions 
of the Guidelines that made them mandatory, making them effectively 
advisory.41  As a result, sentencing courts were required to “consider 
guidelines ranges” but permitted to “tailor the sentence in light of other 
statutory concerns.”42  The Court also ruled that the standard of review 
for sentencing appeals would be a “review for unreasonableness.”43  
This standard affords a high level of deference to the sentencing judge, 
including the judge’s consideration of various factors in determining the 
appropriate sentence.44 
B.  The Guidelines and How They Work Today 
The Guidelines are long and complicated.45  This Comment focuses 
on a judge’s discretion to sentence a defendant within the Guidelines 
range, depart from that range, or vary from that range.  To understand 
these concepts, it is first important to understand how defendants are 
sentenced under the Guidelines.  Since Booker, the Court has adopted a 
three-step process for sentencing: the judge should (1) properly 
determine the Guidelines range, (2) determine whether to depart based 
on the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, and (3) determine 
 
 36 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. 
 37 Id. at 305. 
 38 Yellen, supra note 1, at 172. 
 39 Id. 
 40 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005). 
 41 Id. at 246. 
 42 Id. at 245. 
 43 Id. at 261 (citations omitted). 
 44 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (explaining that the Booker 
“reasonableness” standard “asks whether the trial court abused its discretion”). 
 45 The Guidelines Manual is over 600 pages consisting of eight chapters with over 
100 parts and sub-parts.  See generally USSG, supra note 2. 
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whether to vary based on statutory factors.46  Although Booker still 
requires sentencing courts to consider the Guidelines,47 subsequent 
case law instructs courts to make a decision based on an individualized 
assessment and not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.48  
Furthermore, while Supreme Court precedent requires evidence that 
increases a statutory minimum or maximum to be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt,49 other factual findings—specifically those that go 
toward a sentence within the Guidelines range or a downward 
departure or variance—still carry the preponderance of the evidence 
standard.50 
1.  Determining the Guidelines Range 
First, the sentencing judge consults Appendix A of the Guidelines 
Manual to determine which offense guideline to apply.51  This Appendix 
is an index of each federal criminal statute matched to their applicable 
offense guideline.52  This yields a base offense level.53  For example, a 
judge sentencing a defendant guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon 
with intent to do bodily harm will check Appendix A for 18 U.S.C. 
§ 113(a)(3),54 see it matches with offense guideline 2A2.2,55 and consult 
the Guidelines to determine that the base offense level is 14.56  The judge 
then consults any specific characteristics under the offense guideline 
and chapter three of the Guidelines Manual to determine whether there 
are additional adjustments to be made on the base offense level.57  
Continuing the example, if the defendant used and discharged a 
firearm,58 the assault was motivated by money or something of value,59 
and the defendant clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility,60 
the offense level would be 19.   
 
 46 PRIMER DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 2–3 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 2019) [hereinafter 
PRIMER]; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). 
 47 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 48 Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 
 49 See supra Section II.A. 
 50 See United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 51 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 13. 
 52 See USSG, supra note 2, app. A. 
 53 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 13. 
 54 The federal assault statute.  18 U.S.C. § 113. 
 55 USSG, supra note 2, app. A. 
 56 Id. § 2A2.2. 
 57 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 14. 
 58 Increase by five levels.  USSG, supra note 2, § 2A2.2(b)(2). 
 59 Increase by two levels.  Id. § 2A2.2(b)(5). 
 60 Decrease by two levels.  Id. § 3E1.1(a). 
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Our hypothetical defendant served less than 60 days for a prior 
crime61 and committed the instant assault while on probation,62 thus 
giving the defendant four criminal history points.  This places the 
defendant in Zone D of the sentencing table with a Guidelines range of 
37–46 months imprisonment.63  Accordingly, the judge has nearly 
limitless discretion to consider almost any information in deciding to 
sentence the defendant to a specific term of imprisonment anywhere 
within that range.64  The judge, however, may also consider any grounds 
for a departure or variance from the applicable Guidelines range.65  
While the two technically differ, they both operate to allow the judge to 
impose a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range.66 
2.  Departures and Variances 
“‘Departure’ is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to 
non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the 
Guidelines.”67  The Guidelines define departure as the “imposition of a 
sentence outside the applicable guideline range or of a sentence that is 
otherwise different from the guideline sentence.”68  Put another way, 
“[a] ‘departure’ is typically a change from the final sentencing range 
computed by examining the provisions of the guidelines themselves.”69  
Departures are commonly requested by the prosecutor to reward 
cooperation or triggered “by other factors that take the case ‘outside the 
heartland’ contemplated by the Sentencing Commission when it drafted 
the guidelines for a typical offense.”70  As such, departures are meant to 
be rare and apply to exceptional cases.71  In sum, there are several 
defining characteristics of departures: (1) they are statutorily 
authorized;72 (2) they require an aggravating or mitigating 
 
 61 Two points toward Criminal History Category.  USSG, supra note 2, § 4A1.1(b). 
 62 Two more points toward Criminal History Category.  Id. § 4A1.1(d). 
 63 Id. Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Table. 
 64 Id. § 1B1.4. 
 65 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 14. 
 66 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 18. 
 67 Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008). 
 68 USSG, supra note 2, § 1B1.1, cmt. (n.1(F)). 
 69 United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Cruz-Perez, 567 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009)), cert. denied, 
568 U.S. 1182 (2013).  
 70 Id. (emphasis added). 
 71 PRIMER, supra note 46, at 5. 
 72 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence . . . within the 
range . . . unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance . . . not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission 
. . . .”). 
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circumstance not considered by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the Guidelines;73 and (3) the departing judge must still 
consult the “sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official 
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.”74 
Variances, on the other hand, are not subject to the Guidelines 
analysis in the way departures are.75  While the Guidelines expressly 
prohibit consideration of various factors in granting a departure,76 these 
same factors are fair game to a judge granting a variance.77  This 
difference will sometimes result in a court granting both a departure 
and a variance.78  A judge grants a variance when she “imposes a 
sentence above or below the otherwise properly calculated final 
sentencing range based on application of the other statutory factors in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”79  The many factors listed include “the history and 
characteristics of the defendant.”80 
While sentencing judges must state the reasons for a particular 
sentence in open court, judges varying or departing from the Guidelines 
range must also specifically state the reasons in a “statement of reasons” 
form.81  Whether these reasons result in a sentence within the 
Guidelines range or in a departure or variance, they generally take the 
form of various mitigating or aggravating circumstances presented in 
the presentence report or at the sentencing hearing.82  This may include 
a slew of factors unrelated to the instant offense: defendant’s abusive 
upbringing; functional illiteracy; learning disability; absence of positive 
male role models; addiction; efforts to be a functioning member of 
society; stated desire to rehabilitate; remorse;83 significantly reduced 
mental capacity; aberrant behavior; anticipated trauma to a defendant’s 
infant if separated from her;84 vulnerability in prison; and HIV positive 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id.  
 75 United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 317 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 76 See, e.g., USSG, supra note 2, § 5H1.10 (policy statement providing that race, sex, 
national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status are not relevant factors). 
 77 United States v. Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 830–31 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 78 See PRIMER, supra note 46, at 39 (giving the example of departing for substantial 
assistance under 5K1.1 and varying for defendant characteristics and history (ones not 
generally allowed by the Guidelines for purposes of a departure) under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)). 
 79 PRIMER, supra note 46, at 5. 
 80 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
 81 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). 
 82 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
 83 United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 685 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 84 United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338–39 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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status.85  Ironically, although the Guidelines attempt to restrict a 
sentencing judge’s ability to consider certain factors,86 it also concedes 
that “it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that 
encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a 
sentencing decision.”87   
Although sentencing judges have more discretion now that the 
Guidelines are advisory and the system provides for departures and 
variances, mandatory minimums are still an issue.88  Mandatory 
minimums restrict judges and place a lot of sentencing power in the 
hands of the legislature and prosecutors.89  That said, in 2018, only 
24.7% of federal offenders were convicted of offenses carrying 
mandatory minimum penalties.90  And there are ways to avoid 
mandatory minimums; 40.6% of these offenders were relieved of the 
mandatory minimum due to “substantial assistance” or through the 
“safety valve provision.”91  A defendant who has substantially assisted 
the government in the investigation or prosecution of another person 
may receive, upon motion of the prosecution, a sentence below a 
mandatory minimum.92  Defendants convicted of certain drug-
trafficking offenses may qualify for a departure from the mandatory 
minimum through the statutory “safety valve.”93  In these drug-
trafficking cases—usually low-level, non-violent offenses94—the 
sentencing judge considers five statutory criteria to determine whether 
to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum.95  While 
mandatory minimums and their effect on the discretion of sentencing 
judges are an important part of the sentencing conversation, they are 
beyond the scope of this Comment.  This Comment recognizes that they 
exist and sometimes limit judges’ sentencing capability.  But the present 
focus is on the many instances in which mandatory minimums do not 
 
 85 United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 86 See, e.g., USSG, supra note 2, § 5H1.12 (stating that “lack of guidance as a youth” is 
not grounds for departure). 
 87 USSG, supra note 2, Ch. 1, Pt. A, introduction, 4(b). 
 88 See Hofer, supra note 1, at 137. 
 89 Hofer, supra note 1, at 140–41; see also USSG, supra note 2, § 5G1.1 (noting that, 
when statutory minimums or maximums conflict with the Guidelines range, the 
Guidelines defer to the statute). 
 90 QUICK FACTS MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES 1 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 2018). 
 91 Id. at 1. 
 92 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
 93 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 9; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 
 94 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 9. 
 95 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (these criteria include the defendant’s criminal history, 
absence of violence, death, or injury, role in the offense, and cooperation and 
truthfulness); see also USSG, supra note 2, § 5C1.2. 
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apply, and judges have wide latitude to consider facts that lead to more 
individualized sentences. 
3.  Sentencing Post-Booker  
Although the Guidelines were an attempt to control the sentencing 
process,96 statistics show that, since Booker, judges have gotten more 
comfortable with imposing sentences below the Guidelines range.97  
Sentences within range have fallen since Booker, and most of the 
departures and variances have been downward.  In 2006, the year after 
Booker was decided, judges imposed 61.7% of sentences within the 
Guidelines range, 1.6% above the range, and a total of 36.6% below the 
range.98  Of those sentences below the Guidelines range, 24.6% were 
government sponsored,99 and 12% were non-government sponsored.100  
In 2018, 51% of sentences were within the Guidelines range, 2.6% 
above the range, and a total of 46.5% below the range.101  Of those 
sentences below the Guidelines range, 26.5% were government 
sponsored, and 20% were non-government sponsored.102  These 
statistics show a 10% decrease in sentences imposed within the 
Guidelines range since Booker, and nearly all of the difference has been 
made up by an increase in downward departures and variances.  For 
whatever reason, judges seem happy to regain some of their sentencing 
discretion. 
The question is why.  Judges do have philosophical differences,103 
and those who disagreed with the Guidelines may have been looking for 
a way out, even before the Court heard Booker.  After all, judges are 
human, not immune to cognitive dissonance, and perhaps felt that some 
individuals, and maybe even some offenses, did not deserve the level of 
punishment doled out by the Guidelines.104  Perhaps this increase in 
 
 96 Hofer, supra note 1, at 159. 
 97 See, generally, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (U.S. 
SENTENCING CMM’N 2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (U.S. 
SENTENCING CMM’N 2018). 
 98 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 1 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 
2006). 
 99 One example of this is when the government moves for a departure due to the 
defendant’s § 5K1.1 substantial assistance.  See id. (14.4% in 2006). 
 100 Id. (4.7% of which were departures and 7.3% of which were variances). 
 101 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 11 (U.S. SENTENCING CMM’N 
2018). 
 102 Id. (2.5% were departures and 17.4% variances). 
 103 Hofer, supra note 1, at 160. 
 104 See Barkow, supra note 1, at 1148 (suggesting that the Court’s interest in its 
“bipolar approach to substantive sentencing law” allows it to “feel better about its role” 
in administering punishment). 
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departures and variances is a modest sigh of relief that the Court took a 
firm, positive stance on judicial discretion in the sentencing process.105  
Even more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has upheld the 
principle that “possession of the fullest information possible concerning 
the defendant’s life and characteristics” is essential to the sentencing 
process.106   
There is a dense forest of legal and philosophical scholarship on the 
issue of whether and how much discretion should be in the hands of 
sentencing judges.107  On the one hand, individual cases are nuanced and 
require “a certain fluidity in imposing punishment,” best exercised by 
the trial judge who better understands the “full complexity of the 
offender and . . . appreciate[s] the subtleties in determining the 
punishment that justice demands.”108  Furthermore, it would be unjust 
to impose the same punishment for people with different backgrounds, 
just as it would be unjust to impose different punishments for those 
convicted of similar crimes with similar backgrounds and 
circumstances.109  On the other hand, wide discretion may lead to 
sentencing discrepancies for people who have committed the same 
crime.110  Additionally, judges exercising wide discretion sometimes act 
more like medical examiners or conduct a unique form of moral 
reasoning—a role judges are not familiar with and a setting where due 
process may not exist.111  Whether discretionary sentencing should exist 
and whether it should fall on the judge are beyond the scope of this 
Comment.  This Comment accepts the existence of Booker and the 
current federal sentencing scheme and analyzes how this scheme 
should (if at all) apply to fetal trauma evidence at sentencing. 
 
 105 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted 
the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a 
statutory range.  Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by 
these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the SRA the 
provisions that make the guidelines binding on district judges . . . .”). 
 106 Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (quoting Williams v. New York, 
337 U.S. 241, 246–47 (1949)).  The Court also noted that Congress even codified this 
principle.  Id. (“Congress codified this principle at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that 
‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information’ a sentencing court may consider 
‘concerning the [defendant’s] background, character, and conduct,’ and at § 3553(a), 
which sets forth certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including ‘the 
history and characteristics of the defendant.’”). 
 107 See, e.g., Hofer, supra note 1; Priester, supra note 1; Bowman, supra note 1; 
Ramirez, supra note 1; Barkow, supra note 1; Yellen, supra note 1. 
 108 Thompson, supra note 1. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Bowman, supra note 1, at 371.  This harkens back to the arguments made by the 
reformers in justifying the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act.  See supra Section II.A. 
 111 Bowman, supra note 1, at 373. 
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III.  BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND CRIMINAL LAW 
Whether and to what extent behavioral science research is allowed 
in court—specifically at sentencing—raises several important 
questions.112  How reliable is the scientific research?  What purpose 
should it serve?  Should people predisposed to certain types of behavior 
be punished for that behavior?113  If so, should predisposition serve as a 
mitigating or aggravating factor?114  This Part seeks to explore these 
questions and set the tone for whether, and to what extent, fetal trauma 
evidence should be allowed at sentencing.  It begins with a brief history 
of behavioral sciences in the legal system and then discusses how 
scientific findings should apply, if at all. 
A.  Behavioral Science in the Legal System and Admissibility of 
Scientific Evidence 
Although early application of behavioral sciences in law focused on 
psychological research in criminal cases,115 it was not until Brown v. 
Board of Education that psychological research, and as a result, 
behavioral sciences in general, gained prominence in the legal system.116  
A significant part of the growth of psychology in criminal law was in the 
assessment of criminal defendants for criminological or mental health 
purposes.117  Since then, behavioral sciences have played a role in 
several areas in the law: evaluating mental illness to reduce 
blameworthiness,118 determining the extent of physical brain injuries,119 
and determining a defendant’s free will.120  The psychiatric profession 
began to study battered-child syndrome in 1963 and suggested that 
victims of violence in childhood would become future perpetrators of 
 
 112 Tufik Y. Shayeb, Behavioral Genetics & Criminal Culpability: Addressing the 
Problem of Free Will in the Context of The Modern American Justice System, 19 U.D.C. L. 
REV. 1, 53 (2016). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 James R. P. Ogloff et al., Education and Training in Psychology and Law/Criminal 
Justice: Historical Foundations, Present Structures, and Future Developments, 23 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 200, 210 (1996). 
 116 Id. at 207–08; see also, Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 
483, 494 n.11 (1954), supplemented sub nom. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 117 Ogloff et al., supra note 115, at 211. 
 118 Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, in THE IMPACT OF 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 125, 129 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 137. 
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violence.121  It was not until Daubert, however, that the Court addressed 
the admissibility of scientific evidence at trial.122 
Before Daubert, scientific evidence was only allowed if it was 
produced by techniques that have “general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.”123  The Court in Daubert ruled that federal 
courts should look to the Federal Rules of Evidence and only allow 
scientific evidence that is “reliable,” “relevant,” and “ground[ed] in the 
methods and procedures of science.”124  The Court also noted that, 
although the evidence must be more than “subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation,”125 it does not have to be “‘known’ to a 
certainty,” since “there are no certainties in science.”126  The Court then 
stressed the importance of the validity of the scientific methodology 
used to produce the scientific evidence being offered127 and noted its 
confidence in federal judges to make this inquiry.128  In determining the 
admissibility of scientific evidence at trial, a district judge is supposed 
to make several appropriate observations:129 whether a theory or 
technique can be or has been tested;130 whether the theory/technique 
has been subject to peer review and publication;131 “the known or 
potential rate of error;”132 and the scientific community’s “general 
acceptance” of the research.133  
It is important to note that this standard applies to the admissibility 
of scientific evidence at trial,134 and such standards do not apply to a 
judge’s considerations at sentencing.135  But scholars suggest that 
 
 121 George C. Curtis, Violence Breeds Violence—Perhaps?, 120 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 386, 
386 (1963). 
 122 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993). 
 123 Brett Walker, When the Facts and the Law are Against You, Argue the Genes?: A 
Pragmatic Analysis of Genotyping Mitigation Defenses for Psychopathic Defendants in 
Death Penalty Cases, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1779, 1807 (2013); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 124 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90. 
 125 Id. at 590. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 592–93. 
 128 Id. at 593. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 131 Id. at 593–94 (although even “new” theories and techniques should not be 
deemed per se inadmissible). 
 132 Id. at 594. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 589 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702) (referring to scientific knowledge in assisting 
the “trier of fact . . . to determine a fact in issue”). 
 135 USSG, supra note 2, § 6A1.3 cmt. (noting that, when sentencing judges consider 
facts, they “are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial”). 
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Daubert can be used as a framework for sentencing judges136 because 
judges still need to give reasons for their sentences,137 the sentences 
must withstand the reasonableness standard on appeal,138 and there 
seems to be no working standard for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence at sentencing.  Atkins v. Virginia139 is one of the most notable 
cases where scientific evidence was used at sentencing, and the case 
demonstrates the Court’s—and ultimately society’s—discomfort in 
imposing sentences that may be too harsh for the specific offender. 
B.  Behavioral Science and Sentencing 
Daryl Renard Atkins, the defendant, was convicted of capital 
murder, among other crimes, and sentenced to death.140  At sentencing, 
the prosecutor introduced two aggravating circumstances: future 
dangerousness and “vileness of the offense.”141  Atkins introduced one 
witness, Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic psychologist who, after evaluating 
Atkins, testified that he was “mildly mentally retarded.”142  Dr. Nelson’s 
evaluation consisted of interviews with people who knew Atkins, school 
and court records, and an IQ test that showed Atkins had an IQ of 59.143  
The Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that “death is not a 
suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”144  In its 
reasoning, the Court noted the “evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.”145  The Court determined that there 
was a national consensus reflecting “widespread judgment about the 
relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship 
between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the 
death penalty.”146  According to the Court, imposing the death sentence 
on “mentally retarded” defendants does not advance objectives such as 
 
 136 Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting 
Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1859 (2003) (in the 
context of using future dangerousness predictions in capital sentencings).  For example, 
the Second Circuit implicitly invoked Daubert in reversing an overly harsh sentence 
after finding that the district court impermissibly relied “on its unsupported theory of 
genetics” in its decision.  United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 137 THE BASICS, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
 138 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). 
 139 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 140 Id. at 307. 
 141 Id. at 307–08. 
 142 Id. at 308. 
 143 Id. at 308–09. 
 144 Id. at 321. 
 145 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. 
 146 Id. at 317. 
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retributivism and deterrence because they lack the requisite culpability 
and ability to commit premeditated crimes.147  
While Atkins addressed those diagnosed with “mental retardation,” 
the Court hinted at the possibility of using other factors in mitigating 
sentencing that relate to “the diminished ability to understand and 
process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical 
reasoning, or to control impulses.”148  Also, while the Court addressed 
these factors in the context of the death penalty149 this reasoning has 
been used in subsequent cases to justify a shift in noncapital 
sentences.150  The Court even went one step further and held in Roper v. 
Simmons151 that since juveniles have a diminished sense of 
responsibility, courts should not impose the death penalty on them;152 
thus realizing the possibility discussed in Atkins that a full diagnosis of 
“mental retardation” might not be necessary to avoid the death 
penalty.153  Finally, the Court in Graham v. Florida154 extended these 
principles to noncapital cases, holding that courts should not impose 
sentences of life imprisonment without parole on juvenile offenders in 
non-homicide cases.155 
C.  Is Behavioral Science Evidence Mitigating or Aggravating? 
The application of behavioral science in sentencing decisions begs 
the question whether such evidence should be a mitigating or 
aggravating factor.  At first glance, the question seems simple—we 
should not hold those with genetic or biologic “deficiencies” to the same 
penological standards as the “normal” culpable criminal.156  After all, 
 
 147 Id. at 319–20. 
 148 Id. at 320 (emphasis added). 
 149 Id. (noting that deterrence is not furthered if these impairments “make it less 
likely that [defendants] can process the information of the possibility of execution as a 
penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.”). 
 150 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 643 F.3d 451, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 151 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 152 Id. at 569. 
 153 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320; see also Matthew L. Baum, The Monoamine Oxidase A 
(MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is It Relevant to Criminal Trials?, 6 
NEUROETHICS 287, 287 (2013) (Italian judge used evidence of genetic variation linked to 
aggression in reducing defendant’s sentence); Hill v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 
2003) (although death sentence eventually imposed, judge did allow, for mitigation 
purposes, expert witness testimony at sentencing regarding defendant’s serotonin 
deficiency that predisposed defendant to aggressive behavior). 
 154 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 155 Id. at 82. 
 156 Dorothy Nelkin, After Daubert: The Relevance and Reliability of Genetic 
Information, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2121 (1994) (“Biological defenses have been used 
to mitigate punishment on the assumption that genetic predisposition precludes free 
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culpability—while more rigid when determining guilt—is a more 
flexible concept and can have a greater impact at sentencing.157  For 
example, in arguing that childhood trauma diminishes a defendant’s 
culpability,158 one scholar contrasts affirmative defenses, such as duress 
and necessity, to the use of evidence of childhood trauma at 
sentencing.159  While duress and necessity require a strict showing that 
a defendant’s actions were “influenced . . . by the exigencies of the 
desperate situations in which [he] find[s] [him]sel[f],” sentencing 
decisions do not require a similar “lack of choice.”160  Because of this less 
strict standard at sentencing, Bagaric argues, evidence of external 
factors such as childhood trauma removes enough choice from the 
defendant such that it should be admitted and considered toward 
mitigating a sentence.161 
But not everyone agrees that lessened culpability should be the 
main concern at sentencing if a concern at all.162  Some argue that 
behavioral science, such as genetic information, could indicate a 
proclivity for violence, be used to predict future dangerousness,163 and 
thus justify a harsher sentence.164  For example, courts recognize the 
possible aggravating nature of this evidence,165 and some have even 
considered it as aggravating against certain defendants.166  In addition 
 
will.”); Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Judging Genes: Implications of the 
Second Generation of Genetic Tests in the Courtroom, 66 MD. L. REV. 858, 871 (2007) 
(genetic tests could be used as a mitigating factor if judges agree that genetic makeup 
could reduce free will). 
 157 Mirko Bagaric et al., Trauma and Sentencing: The Case for Mitigating Penalty for 
Childhood Physical and Sexual Abuse, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 39 (2019). 
 158 Id. at 34. 
 159 Id. at 40. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 40–41. 
 162 See, e.g., Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 156, at 871–72; Jones, supra note 
118, at 138. 
 163 Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 156, at 871. 
 164 See, e.g., Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001), adopted sub 
nom. Landrigan v. Schriro, 501 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Cossey, 632 
F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 165 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (noting that reliance on mental 
retardation as a mitigating factor can be a double-edged sword that may enhance the 
likelihood that the jury will find the aggravating factor of future dangerousness). 
 166 See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 907 F.3d 121, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that 
a childhood marred by sexual abuse contributed to distorted perception of rape and 
child molestation thus making defendant a moderate to high risk to reoffend), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1300 (2019); Cossey, 632 F.3d at 86 (district court imposed a greater 
sentence because it felt that defendant had a genetic predisposition to view child 
pornography and thus a higher likelihood of re-offending); Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1229 
(“although [defendant]’s new evidence can be called mitigating in some slight sense, it 
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to future dangerousness, there is the possibility that such information 
should be an aggravating factor for the sake of deterrence.167  If some 
defendants are predisposed toward violent behavior but not completely 
out of control, should we not be more inclined to impose a greater 
deterrent effect on them?168  The same could be said for a greater need 
to incapacitate or a lower likelihood of rehabilitation. 
Genetic information can simultaneously cut in different directions: 
mitigation, aggravation, no impact at all, or somewhere in between.169  
This dilemma is yet another argument in support of higher discretion in 
the hands of the sentencing judge, who can appreciate the nuance of 
each case.  That said, it is also an argument against allowing this 
scientific research altogether.  Whether such information should, as a 
general rule, be allowed and act as a mitigating or aggravating factor is 
beyond the scope of this Comment.  But the human condition is complex, 
and removing a person’s liberty is not a task we should take lightly.  As 
such, this Comment takes the position that, given the right 
circumstances, this type of information (assuming it is supported by 
reliable research, properly demonstrated, and appropriately 
considered) can play an important role.  That said, fetal trauma—as this 
Comment argues170—does not satisfy this threshold for consideration.  
When such information does meet this threshold, judges should 
consider it as a mitigating factor for several reasons.   
First, as the Supreme Court noted, our society is undergoing a 
utilitarian progression, and a sign of a maturing society is tolerance and 
understanding of one another, including criminal defendants.171  
Second, while we should be concerned with the goal of protecting 
society from those who might wish to harm it, or cannot help but doing 
so, treating genetic predisposition as an aggravating factor is not the 
best way to achieve that goal.  Behavioral genetics is often 
misunderstood by non-scientists, inclining people to think crime is the 
result of criminals having specific genes.172  The reality is quite the 
opposite: “genes do not ‘determine’ behavior to any extent greater than 
environments do.”173  The irony of this is that the same argument can be 
applied to preventing genetic information altogether—after all, if genes 
 
would also have shown the court that it could anticipate that he would continue to be 
violent”). 
 167 Jones, supra note 118, at 139. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See infra Part V. 
 171 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 172 Jones, supra note 118, at 142. 
 173 Jones, supra note 118, at 143. 
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do not determine behavior, why should we consider it as a mitigating 
factor?  But just because predispositions are not determinative of 
behavior does not mean they do not require rehabilitation.  And our 
focus on rehabilitation must not accept the idea that certain types of 
people are rehabilitation proof.  Different people respond differently to 
different forms of rehabilitation; there is no one-size-fits-all.174  Finally, 
even the law provides that evidence such as genetic predispositions and 
childhood trauma should be used as a mitigating factor.175  For example, 
in determining whether the death sentence is justified, courts are 
directed to consider—as a mitigating factor—a  “defendant’s capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct . . . regardless of whether 
the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense to the charge.”176  
In addition to other specific mitigating factors, the court is then open-
endedly directed to consider “[o]ther factors in the defendant’s 
background, record, or character.”177  Conversely, all the aggravating 
factors listed in the statute relate to the defendant’s instant offense or 
criminal history, and there is no provision directing the court to open-
endedly consider the defendant’s background or character for 
aggravating purposes.178  This plays out in an excellent example of 
information about a defendant that derives its credibility from 
behavioral science and acts as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing—Adverse Childhood Experiences. 
D.  Adverse Childhood Experiences 
ACEs are potentially traumatic events, such as violence, abuse, or 
neglect, that occur between infancy and 17 years of age.179  Of over 
200,000 noninstitutionalized adults surveyed between 2011–2014, 
almost two-thirds reported having at least one ACE, and more than one 
 
 174 Douglas B. Marlowe, The Verdict on Drug Courts and Other Problem-Solving Courts, 
2 CHAP. J. CRIM. SCI. 57, 60 (2011) (“No intervention should be expected to work for all 
individuals.  In fact, it is a sign of an immature profession if one intervention is applied 
to all clients.”). 
 175 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592. 
 176 Id. § 3592(a)(1). 
 177 Id. § 3592(a)(8). 
 178 See id. § 3592(a)–(d). 
 179 About Adverse Childhood Experiences, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
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in four reported having three or more.180  This is striking since ACEs can 
have a lasting impact on future behavior, health, and life 
opportunities.181  Given these findings, it is no wonder that some 
advocate using ACEs as a mitigating factor at sentencing.182  And judges 
seem to agree: in a 2002 survey of district judges on the Guidelines, over 
60% responded that they believe more emphasis should be placed on 
mental conditions when determining sentences.183  This Section begins 
with a brief introduction of ACEs research and then discusses several 
cases where ACEs were used as a mitigating factor. 
1.  ACEs Research  
While the nuances of ACEs research are important to address, a 
crucial aspect of this research, with regards to sentencing, is that it is 
generally recognized that ACEs highly correlate with various negative 
outcomes in adulthood—especially risky behavior.184  This general 
recognition is supported by numerous observational studies conducted 
over the past half-century and has even been applied to criminal law 
since 1963.185  The National Institute of Justice has sponsored and 
published several studies in this area.186  The English study found that 
children who were victims of violence were significantly more likely to 
be arrested later in life.187  The Widom study found that youth victims of 
abuse were 11 times more likely to be arrested for a violent crime as a 
juvenile and almost three times more likely to be arrested for a violent 
 
 180 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System ACE Data, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION (last updated Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
aces/ace-brfss.html. 
 181 About ACEs, supra note 179.  
 182 Bagaric et al., supra note 157, at 40–41. 
 183 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N’S SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES, app. B, B-8 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2002) (https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/20021202_Judge_Survey.pdf). 
 184 See, e.g., About ACEs, supra note 179; ACEs and Toxic Stress: Frequently Asked 
Questions, CENTER ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD HARV. UNIV. (last visited Nov. 2, 2019), 
https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/aces-and-toxic-stress-frequently-
asked-questions; Adverse Childhood Experiences, NAT’L CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION MONTH 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/preventing/
preventionmonth/resources/ace. 
 185 See Curtis, supra note 121, at 386. 
 186 See, e.g., Cathy S. Widom & Michael G Maxfield, An Update on the “Cycle of Violence”, 
in NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1 (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2001); Diana J. 
English et al., Childhood Victimization and Delinquency, Adult Criminality, and Violent 
Criminal Behavior: A Replication and Extension (NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE 
SERVICE 2002). 
 187 Widom & Maxfield, supra note 186, at 1 (nearly 60% more likely to be arrested as 
a juvenile and nearly 30% more likely as an adult). 
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crime as an adult.188  More recent studies have corroborated these 
findings.  For example, a 2012 study found that abused children are 
more than twice as likely as their non-abused counterparts to have a 
record of a violent offense.189  A 2018 systematic review of research into 
the impact of childhood abuse on adult male prisoners found that 
childhood abuse was “strongly associated with adult aggression, 
impulsivity, and antisocial behavior.”190  The list goes on.191  Given the 
strength and breadth of this research, it is no wonder judges are more 
comfortable using ACEs as a mitigating factor at sentencing.192  First, 
however, it is important to note that not only is the use of ACEs at 
sentencing somewhat dissonant with the express policies and directives 
of the Guidelines but the Guidelines seem to be at odds with themselves 
in this regard. 
2.  ACEs and the Guidelines 
Information regarding ACEs generally makes its way into 
sentencing through the presentence report.193  A probation officer 
creates a presentence report containing all the information a judge 
might need to impose a proper sentence.194  If undisputed, the court 
accepts all the information in the presentence report as a finding of 
fact.195  On the one hand, the Guidelines state that “lack of guidance as a 
youth” and similar disadvantaged upbringing are not grounds for a 
departure.196  As to the definition of “lack of guidance as a youth,” a mere 
different upbringing may not qualify as a departure factor,197 but 
 
 188 English et al., supra note 186, at 33–34. 
 189 James Topitzes et al., From Child Maltreatment to Violent Offending: An 
Examination of Mixed-Gender and Gender-Specific Models, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
2322, 2334, 2338 (2012). 
 190 Teresa Goddard & Julie Ann Pooley, The Impact of Childhood Abuse on Adult Male 
Prisoners: A Systematic Review, 34 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 215, 218 (2018). 
 191 See, e.g., Kathryn H. Howell et al., The Relationship Between Types of Childhood 
Victimisation and Young Adulthood Criminality, 27 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 341, 
342 (2017); Joshua P. Mersky & Arthur J. Reynolds, Child Maltreatment and Violent 
Delinquency: Disentangling Main Effects and Subgroup Effects, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 
246, 246 (2007) (violent offenses committed at a significantly higher rate by those who 
were victims of abuse in their youth compared to those who suffered none). 
 192 See infra Section III.D.2. 
 193 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (noting the report must contain “information that 
assesses any financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on any victim”). 
 194 USSG, supra note 2, § 6A1.1(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)–(B). 
 195 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(A). 
 196 USSG, supra note 2, § 5H1.12.  That said, there are plenty of examples of cases in 
which the judge, despite this explicit directive, considered “lack of guidance as a youth” 
as a mitigating factor.  See infra Section III.D.3. 
 197 See United Stated v. Godinez, 474 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2007) (losing father, 
dropping out of school, and being illiterate until adolescence not enough for downward 
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“extreme childhood abuse” would qualify.198  In the same chapter, 
however, the Guidelines note that “mental and emotional conditions 
may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if 
[they] . . . distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the 
guidelines.”199  Additional language allows departures based on 
circumstances and characteristics not taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission; however, the Guidelines also note that this is 
for extreme circumstances or where the characteristic is present “to an 
exceptional degree.”200 
An example of a departure under § 5K2.13 illustrates the lack of 
clarity and unwillingness to give bright-line direction to judges in this 
area.  § 5K2.13 allows judges to consider “diminished capacity” toward 
a downward departure.201  Specifically, the Guidelines require a 
two-step process in considering diminished capacity: (1) whether “the 
defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly 
reduced mental capacity”; and (2) whether the reduced “capacity 
contributed significantly to the commission of the offense.”202  A 
significantly reduced mental capacity can be determined in one of two 
instances: (1) an impaired ability to understand the wrongfulness of an 
action or to exercise power of reason; or (2) an impaired ability to 
control behavior the defendant knows is wrongful.203  Studies on the 
effects ACEs have on brain development have demonstrated that adults 
who have suffered ACEs develop increased aggression, impulsive anger, 
and “impulsive decision-making during states of fear emotion.”204  The 
rift between the application of “diminished capacity” and ACEs research 
at sentencing is further widened since the Guidelines do not allow 
“diminished capacity” to be a factor in specific cases: where drugs or 
alcohol created the diminished capacity; where there is a great need to 
protect the public, either because of the violence of the offense or 
defendant’s criminal history; or where the defendant is being convicted 
of an offense involving obscenity, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, 
 
departure); United States v. Dyck, 334 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2003) (ignorance and lack of 
education from Mennonite upbringing not enough for downward departure). 
 198 United States v. Rivera, 192 F.3d 81, 84–85 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United States 
v. Walter, 256 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering extraordinary childhood abuse 
as a sentencing factor). 
 199 USSG, supra note 2, § 5H1.3. 
 200 USSG, supra note 2, § 5K2.0. 
 201 USSG, supra note 2, § 5K2.13. 
 202 PRIMER, supra note 46, at 25. 
 203 USSG, supra note 2, § 5K2.13 cmt. (n.1). 
 204 Michael D. De Bellis & Abigail Zisk, The Biological Effects of Childhood Trauma, 23 
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 185, 205 (2014). 
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abuse of children, or transportation for illegal sexual activity and related 
crimes.205  Yet research indicates that those who have experienced ACEs 
are more likely to commit violent offenses206—thus increasing their 
likelihood of having criminal histories—and more likely to sexually 
abuse others or commit other sex-related crimes as adults.207  Finally, 
regardless of the Guidelines restrictions, sentencing statutes clearly 
express no limitation on what a sentencing judge may consider.208 
3.  ACEs in Sentencing 
These discrepancies are exaggerated by examples of cases in which 
judges applied ACEs as a mitigating factor at sentencing, some in which 
judges outright defied the express policies of the Guidelines.  For 
example, judges and scholars seem to agree that even the milder “lack 
of guidance as a youth” can and should be a mitigating factor at 
sentencing.209  
In a case involving a more extreme example of ACEs, United States 
v. Sawyer,210 the defendant used expert testimony to connect childhood 
trauma to criminal behavior.211  Although the district court did not give 
the testimony much consideration at sentencing, the Second Circuit held 
that the district court “clearly failed to give appropriate weight to a 
factor listed in Section 3553(a) that should have mitigated the sentence 
 
 205 PRIMER, supra note 46, at 25–26. 
 206 See supra Section III.D.1. 
 207 Cathy S. Widom & Christina Massey, Prospective Examination of Whether 
Childhood Sexual Abuse Predicts Subsequent Sexual Offending, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1, 4 
(2015). 
 208 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (generally describing that a sentencing judge shall 
consider the “the history and characteristics of the defendant”); id. § 3661 (“No 
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and 
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may 
receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”). 
 209 See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 865 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2017) (noting that 
the district court took into consideration the defendant’s “lack of guidance as a youth” 
as a mitigating factor despite it being outweighed by other aggravating factors); United 
States v. Bettin, No. CR 17-083-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 3778461, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug. 12, 
2019) (noting “lack of guidance as a youth” as a principal factor in a downward 
departure); see also AMY BARON-EVANS & JENNIFER NILES COFFIN, NO MORE MATH WITHOUT 
SUBTRACTION: DECONSTRUCTING THE GUIDELINES’ PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON MITIGATING 
FACTORS 150 (2010), available at https://fln.fd.org/files/training/no-more-math-
without-subtraction.pdf (“After Booker, there is no longer any need to show extreme 
abuse or neglect to avoid the prohibitions of § 5H1.12, and courts have begun to 
consider disadvantaged youth or lack of guidance as a youth as a factor for sentencing 
below the guideline range.”). 
 210 907 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 211 Id. at 124. 
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substantially: the history and characteristics of the defendant.”212  This 
included childhood sexual abuse, drug and alcohol use, and physical 
abuse the court described as “horrid and nightmarish.”213 
Other recent circuit cases lend further support to the use of ACEs 
at sentencing.  In U.S. v. Phillips,214 the Court, although it did not depart 
downward, considered childhood abuse in refraining from imposing an 
upward variance despite the defendant being eligible for one.215  In U.S. 
v. Carpenter,216 the Court held that the district court did not commit a 
procedural error in considering physical abuse at the hands of the 
defendant’s stepfather as a mitigating factor.217  Finally, U.S. v. 
McBride,218 provides another example of a court disobeying the 
Guidelines.  Although the Guidelines do not allow “diminished capacity” 
as a mitigating factor, the Circuit Court held that the sentencing judge 
did not err in varying downward in a child pornography case because it 
was one of the worst histories of abuse and abandonment the Court had 
ever seen.219 
It seems clear that courts are comfortable enough to stray from the 
Guidelines given the strength of ACEs research, the advisory nature of 
the Guidelines, and the wide discretion they once again possess to 
consider mitigating factors.  The question this Comment presents is 
whether judges could be and should be as comfortable with similarly 
applying fetal trauma. 
  
 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. at 123–24 (noting that the trauma was “unresolved and untreated”). 
 214 461 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 215 Id. at 141. 
 216 803 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 217 Id. at 1233. 
 218 511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 219 Id. at 1298. 
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IV.  FETAL TRAUMA 
Fetal trauma is a term for traumatic experiences, generally 
experienced by the pregnant mother, that have significant effects on the 
developing fetus.220  While some studies indicate a correlation between 
prenatal stress and adverse emotional and behavioral outcomes in 
children,221 most studies in this field have focused on either the 
relationship between prenatal stress and epigenetic mechanisms or 
epigenetic mechanisms and behavioral problems.222  Therefore, to 
understand the possible implications of fetal trauma on future behavior, 
it is first important to have a firm, albeit basic, grasp of epigenetics. 
A.  Epigenetics 
In 1942, the developmental biologist and geneticist C. H. 
Waddington introduced the word “epigenetics” and used it to describe 
the influence of the environment on the human genome.223  Epigenetics 
plays an important role in the interaction of nature and nurture in 
determining human traits.224  This interaction involves something called 
the epigenome—all of the chemical compounds that attach to one’s 
genetic code that regulate the expression or activity of all the individual 
genes.225  Put simply, our genetic code is like hardware (e.g., the central 
processing unit (CPU) inside our laptops), and epigenetic information is 
like the software operating the hardware (e.g., the downloaded 
Microsoft Office products).226  These epigenetic chemical compounds—
the epigenome—turn genes on or off and control the production of 
certain proteins227 without changing the underlying DNA sequence.228  
 
 220 See, e.g., Helena Palma-Gudiel et al., Maternal Psychosocial Stress During 
Pregnancy Alters the Epigenetic Signature of the Glucocorticoid Receptor Gene Promoter 
in Their Offspring: A Meta-Analysis, 10 EPIGENETICS 893, 893 (2015) (malnutrition, 
substance abuse, and psychosocial stressors are some examples of fetal trauma). 
 221 See, e.g., Elisabeth Conradt et al., Incorporating Epigenetic Mechanisms to Advance 
Fetal Programming Theories, 30 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 807, 807 (2018); A. B. Janssen 
et al., A Role for the Placenta in Programming Maternal Mood and Childhood Behavioural 
Disorders, 28 J. NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 1, 1 (2016). 
 222 Conradt et al., supra note 221, at 809. 
 223 Parisa Norouzitallab et al., Can Epigenetics Translate Environmental Cues into 
Phenotypes?, 647 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T. 1281, 1282 (2019). 
 224 Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and Ethical Implications of 
Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX CLEVELAND 1, 1 (2009). 
 225 What is Epigenetics?, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE (last updated Oct. 29, 
2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/howgeneswork/epigenome. 
 226 Rothstein et al, supra note 224, at 1–2. 
 227 Epigenomics Fact Sheet, NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (last updated 
Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-
sheets/Epigenomics-Fact-Sheet. 
 228 Id. 
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Returning to our example, Microsoft Word gives your CPU instructions 
to allow you to write a paper, but it does not alter the physical structure 
of your CPU.  The various cells in our body use these proteins to 
interpret genetic instructions and fulfill their purpose.229  For example, 
on a molecular level, skin cells, brain cells, and muscle cells contain the 
same DNA but have different jobs because of how they receive their 
genetic instructions through epigenetic expression.230  It follows that 
our brain development can be heavily influenced by environmental 
experiences that change our epigenome.231  For example, smoking, diet, 
and other lifestyle factors may induce epigenetic changes.232  These 
epigenetic changes may affect how we respond to adversity, increase 
our chances of developing mental illnesses, such as anxiety and 
depression, or even increase the likelihood of physical ailments, such as 
heart disease or diabetes.233 
Epigenetic changes can be durable and are even inheritable.234  For 
example, evidence suggests that epigenetic changes can affect 
subsequent generations.235  That said, epigenetic changes are also 
sensitive to the developmental stage and are “subject to 
reconfiguration.”236  In fact, developing fetuses and newborns are the 
most susceptible and sensitive to epigenetic changes.237  For example, 
high levels of prenatal stress contribute to excess cortisol exposure, 
which has an impact on gestational health outcomes.238  This basic 
understanding of epigenetics will hopefully make it easier to 
understand the specific findings on the impact fetal trauma has on our 
epigenetic expression. 
 
 229 Id. 
 230 Rachael Rettner, Epigenetics: Definition & Examples, LIVE SCIENCE (June 24, 2013) 
https://www.livescience.com/37703-epigenetics.html. 
 231 NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD, EARLY EXPRESSIONS CAN ALTER 
GENE EXPRESSION AND AFFECT LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT: WORKING PAPER NO. 10 2 (Harvard 
University 2010) [hereinafter EARLY EXPRESSIONS]. 
 232 Fact Sheet, supra note 227. 
 233 EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 3–4. 
 234 Rothstein et al., supra note 224, at 3. 
 235 Rothstein et al., supra note 224, at 5. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Conradt et al., supra note 221, at 811. 
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B.  Fetal Trauma’s Impact on Our Development 
The hypothalamus, pituitary, and adrenal glands make up what is 
known as the HPA axis.239  This axis controls hormonal signaling 
pathways, including those responsible for our stress response.240  
Serotonin is a chemical that is crucial to brain development, mood 
regulation, ability to react to stress, and the development of psychiatric 
disorders.241  It is “also intimately involved in the formation of the fetal 
HPA axis.”242  Much of the research done in the area of epigenetic 
changes and behavior has centered on the development of the HPA axis 
since it is highly linked to behavioral outcomes.243  
Studies have shown a link between prenatal maternal stress and an 
increase of behavioral disorders in children due to an impairment of the 
serotonin systems.244  Chronic activation of this system—often “likened 
to revving a car engine for long periods of time”245—is linked to an 
increased vulnerability to developing psychopathology.246  This 
consistent level of exposure to stress impacts brain development on a 
molecular and structural level and “appears to impair cognition and 
increase anxiety and reactivity to stress.”247 
Another way epigenetic changes in the fetus may affect our 
behavioral development is through changes to the expression of the 
monoglyceride lipase gene (MGLL), which regulates reward, addiction, 
and pain.248  Research in this area demonstrates a correlation249 
between changes to the expression of MGLL, caused by prenatal stress, 
smoking, diet, or substance abuse, and children who develop “conduct 
 
 239 Alison G. Paquette & Carmen J. Marsit, The Developmental Basis of Epigenetic 
Regulation of HTR2A and Psychiatric Outcomes, 113 J. CELLULAR BIOCHEMISTRY 2065, 2066 
(2014). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Susanne Brummelte et al., Developmental Changes in Serotonin Signaling: 
Implications for Early Brain Function, Behavior and Adaptation, 342 NEUROSCIENCE 212, 
212 (2017). 
 242 Paquette & Marsit, supra note 239, at 2066. 
 243 Nicole M. Talge et al., Antenatal Maternal Stress and Long-Term Effects on Child 
Neurodevelopment: How and Why?, 48 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 245, 253 (2007). 
 244 Joey St-Pierre et al., Effects of Prenatal Maternal Stress on Serotonin and Fetal 
Development, 30 PLACENTA S66, S69 (2016). 
 245 EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 3. 
 246 Talge et al., supra note 243, at 254. 
 247 Alexandra Miranda & Nuno Sousa, Maternal Hormonal Milieu Influence on Fetal 
Brain Development, 8 BRAIN BEHAV. 1, 1 (2017). 
 248 Epigenetic Changes at Birth Could Explain Later Behavior Problems, SCIENCE DAILY 
(June 12, 2017), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/06/1706120
94030.htm. 
 249 “Although these findings do not prove causation, they do highlight the neonatal 
period as a potentially important window of biological vulnerability . . . .”  Id. 
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problems” such as fighting, lying, and stealing—behavior that places 
children at a higher risk for severe antisocial behavior.250 
These studies, however, focus on epigenetic changes resulting from 
fetal trauma and tie those changes to what we know about the 
relationship between certain chemicals and human behavior.  There are 
few, if any, fetal trauma studies like the longitudinal observational 
studies on ACEs and criminal behavior.  More of these studies would be 
needed before courts are confident enough to consider this as a factor.  
That said, even if further studies bolster the connection between fetal 
trauma and criminal behavior, it should still not be considered at 
sentencing.  
V.  SHOULD FETAL TRAUMA PLAY A ROLE IN SENTENCING DECISIONS? 
Many fetal complications can have an impact on behavior.251  The 
sheer number of things that can happen to a pregnant mother resulting 
in epigenetic changes to her fetus should alone be reason enough to put 
fetal trauma to the side at sentencing.  Additionally, the research on fetal 
trauma, while peer-reviewed and tested, does not yet create a strong 
enough correlation between fetal trauma and criminal behavior and 
thus lacks the general acceptance by the scientific community afforded 
to ACEs.252  The Sentencing Commission has expressed its disapproval 
for factors that are too amorphous with no restrictions as to how and 
when they could be applied.253  On the other hand, if ever someone’s 
culpability should be reduced by past trauma, it seems wise to consider 
trauma they experience at a time when they are most vulnerable and 
out of control.  Indeed the research, although not as reliable as ACEs 
with regard to criminal behavior, is far from inadequate and does 
demonstrate certain epigenetic changes that can be devastating, lasting, 
and sometimes permanent.254  That said, there are many more 
compelling reasons why fetal trauma should not be considered at 
sentencing.  
These compelling reasons, listed below, can be applied in equal 
force to argue against the consideration of ACEs at sentencing; this 
Comment will apply each in turn.  But whether ACEs should be 
 
 250 Id. 
 251 Jones, supra note 118, at 130.  
 252 See supra Section IV.B. 
 253 William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline 
Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 
84 (1993) (referring to “lack of youthful guidance”).  This, however, may not be a 
valuable argument given judges’ willingness to, when the situation calls for it, disobey 
the Guidelines as to considering “lack of youthful guidance.”  See supra Section III.D.3. 
 254 EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 1, 3. 
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considered at sentencing is beyond the scope of this Comment.  That 
said, it is worthwhile to address this argument briefly.  At first glance, it 
makes sense that the arguments laid out in this Comment against 
considering fetal trauma at sentencing should apply with equal force to 
ACEs.  That said, the two are distinguishable enough to argue for the 
allowance of ACEs while simultaneously drawing the line there.  ACEs 
can help a defendant argue for mitigation when there is no 
record—hospital, school, or diagnosis—of the trauma suffered during 
childhood or its lasting impact.  This is because ACEs are relatively easy 
to present to a court as the defendant consciously lived those 
experiences as opposed to fetal trauma, which occurs in utero.  They are 
also more strongly tied to criminal behavior than fetal trauma and occur 
closer to adulthood, thus decreasing the time in which any lasting 
negative impact can be repaired.  But these arguments cast ACEs 
through the lens by which we view fetal trauma—that of “mental 
illness,” whereby trauma causes cognitive changes affecting behavior on 
a cellular level, thus decreasing one’s culpability.  This implicates 
retribution and deterrence.  There is a stronger argument when taking 
ACEs into account for rehabilitation purposes, such as redirecting a 
defendant to a special program as opposed to a traditional prison.  
For example, restorative justice programs aim to rehabilitate 
defendants regardless of any present mental or physical deficiency that 
causes decreased culpability.255  The underlying philosophy has more to 
do with undoing an ingrained way of life.256  As such, it stands to reason 
that someone who experienced a series of ACEs—abuse, exposure to 
crime, exposure to drug and alcohol abuse—even without experiencing 
a long-term neurological effect, would benefit from an environment that 
seeks to counter those established norms in their life.  To illustrate, let 
us look at two hypothetical defendants: Arthur and Bob.  Arthur and Bob 
grow up in the same household.  Unfortunately, their childhood was 
filled with exposure to abuse, drugs, and criminal behavior.  Bob is 
genetically predisposed in such a way that the ACEs have significant and 
severe lasting impacts to the effect that he has developed antisocial 
behaviors as a result of deficient neurological development.  Arthur is 
genetically predisposed in such a way that these ACEs do not have a 
 
 255 See generally What is Restorative Justice, INSIGHT PRISON PROJECT (last visited Jan. 9, 
2020), http://www.insightprisonproject.org/a-restorative-justice-agency.html; U.S. 
PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERVS., U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASS., RISE PROGRAM 
PACKET (2017), https://www.map.uscourts.gov/sites/map/files/RISE%20Program%
20Statement%202.0%202017.pdf. 
 256 See Paul McCold, Restorative Justice: The Role of the Community, INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES (Mar. 31, 1995), https://www.iirp.edu/news/
restorative-justice-the-role-of-the-community. 
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lasting impact on his neurological development.  That said, Arthur is 
surrounded by negative stimuli and, even without physical changes to 
his brain or his neurotransmission, he sees this world as “normal.”  Both 
men are found guilty of robbery.  Bob would argue that his ACEs 
diminished his culpability as they caused him to have a condition that 
presently affects his impulse control and understanding of social norms.  
Arthur has no present condition that diminished his culpability, but he 
would argue that, having never known a “normal” life, he would greatly 
benefit from a program that could help correct those misguided norms. 
Arthur is the reason judges may want to continue considering ACEs 
at sentencing.  This Comment accepts that ACEs sometimes have a role 
to play in the sentencing process.  That said, the following arguments do 
apply with equal force to the culpability aspect of ACEs and are 
compelling arguments that judges should not continue to use ACEs as a 
reason to simply lower a defendant’s sentence due to diminished 
culpability; rather, judges should reserve the consideration of ACEs for 
diversion to rehabilitative programs. 
A.  “Repairing” Epigenetic Changes 
Assume judges developed enough confidence in criminogenic fetal 
trauma research and could comfortably distinguish between the 
degrees of fetal trauma—from socioeconomic factors to substance 
abuse—that they should and should not consider at sentencing.  There 
is still the issue that many of these changes are epigenetic and thus can 
theoretically be reversed during a defendant’s lifetime.257  Not only do 
different people respond differently to traumatic experiences, but life 
experiences between birth and adulthood can affect the ultimate impact 
trauma has on someone.258  For example, how one responds to stress 
might be altered by environmental inputs during sensitive 
developmental periods.259  In fact, children that may have been more 
biologically susceptible to epigenetic changes in the first place may be 
the best candidates for reprogramming during these periods.260  
Research is ongoing into the various types of treatment that might 
reverse epigenetic alterations: this includes both pharmacological 
 
 257 EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 4; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 227 (“The 
epigenome can also change throughout a person’s lifetime.”). 
 258 SAMHSA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., TRAUMA-INFORMED CARE IN BEHAVIORAL 
HEALTH SERVICES  59 (2014). 
 259 Conradt et al., supra note 221, at 811. 
 260 Id. 
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treatment261 and environmental therapy.262  Even non-targeted 
interventions, such as neighborhoods and social groups, seem to 
promote better health outcomes through epigenetic changes during 
childhood.263  Research even suggests that epigenetic alterations that 
occur because of early stressors may be “normalized or even prevented 
by pharmacological intervention during early life, adolescence as well 
as adulthood.”264  The English study, which was cited to support the use 
of ACEs in sentencing,265 seems to hint at this.  Youth victims of abuse 
were 11 times more likely to be arrested for a violent crime as a juvenile, 
but only 2.7 times more likely to be arrested for the same as an adult.266  
Although it is unclear why, this shows a significant “improvement” in 
the likelihood of arrest for violent crimes between adolescence and 
adulthood. 
But much of this is true for ACEs as well: “The presence of ACEs 
does not mean that a child will experience poor outcomes.  But 
children’s positive experiences or protective factors can prevent 
children from experiencing adversity and can protect against many of 
the negative health and life outcomes even after adversity has 
occurred.”267  Assuming this research on “repairing” epigenetic 
alterations applies equally to fetal trauma and ACEs, it stands to reason 
that judges should either consider fetal trauma or stop considering 
ACEs.  That said, even though there is more time for change between 
fetus and adulthood than childhood and adulthood, there are still other 
reasons beyond epigenetic repair for not considering fetal trauma at 
sentencing. 
B.  Observable or Diagnosable Issues in Adult Defendants 
It bears mentioning that the scientific community does not conduct 
research with the goal of criminal culpability in mind.  The scientific 
 
 261 See, e.g., St-Pierre et al., supra note 244, at S69 (treating anomalies in mice with 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs)); Nadine Provencal & Elisabeth B. 
Binder, The Neurobiological Effects of Stress as Contributors to Psychiatric Disorders: 
Focus On Epigenetics, 30 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 31, 34 (2015). 
 262 Sara Palumbo et al., Genes and Aggressive Behavior: Epigenetic Mechanisms 
Underlying Individual Susceptibility to Aversive Environments, 12 FRONTIERS BEHAV. 
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 5 (2018). 
 263 Colter Mitchell, et al., DNA Methylation, Early Life Environment, and Health 
Outcomes, 79 PEDIATRIC RES. 212, 215 (2016). 
 264 Annamaria Cattaneo et al., Inflammation and Neuronal Plasticity: A Link Between 
Childhood Trauma and Depression Pathogenesis, 9 FRONTIERS CELLULAR NEUROSCIENCE 1, 6 
(2015). 
 265 See supra Section III.D.1. 
 266 English et al., supra note 186, at 33–34. 
 267 About ACEs, supra note 179. 
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community seeks to work backward from observable or diagnosable 
issues, learn why they occur, and figure out how to prevent them 
through policy or intervention.268  Although beyond the scope of this 
Comment, this type of “causation” research would be much more salient 
and useful in civil “litigations regarding multi-generational 
environmentally-driven health effects.”269  While all the research on 
fetal trauma provides a cause for issues developed and retained 
throughout one’s life, those issues are often diagnosable270 or 
measurable through some form of testing or imaging of the adult 
defendant.271  For example, when serotonin is studied in epigenetic fetal 
trauma research, it often concerns an increased “risk of psychiatric 
diseases such as depression, anxiety, or autism later in life.”272  Even the 
Court in Atkins evaluated the admissibility of the defendant’s diagnosis 
as “mentally retarded.”273  Absent a showing at sentencing of mental 
illness or some undiagnosable but observable chemical imbalance, fetal 
trauma may not have had a lasting impact on a given defendant.  
The counter to this, of course, is the same as it was for repairing 
epigenetic alterations; this argument applies to ACEs as well.  Any 
experience of ACEs that had a lasting impact strong enough to mitigate 
a criminal sentence should have resulted in an observable or 
diagnosable issue at sentencing.  This is yet another reason judges 
should not consider even ACEs when determining diminished 
culpability with regards to a decreased sentence for a defendant. 
C.  Cost 
It is easier to present evidence of ACEs than fetal trauma without 
requiring the hiring of an expert to show that those experiences had 
lasting mental or genetic effects on the defendant.  ACEs are often 
 
 268 See EARLY EXPRESSIONS, supra note 231, at 1–2. 
 269 Tania L. Roth, Epigenetic Mechanisms in the Development of Behavior: Advances, 
Challenges, and Future Promises of a New Field, 25 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1279, 1288 
(2013). 
 270 See, e.g., Paquette & Marsit, supra note 239, at 2071 (“Epigenetic regulation has 
arisen as a potential way to explain psychiatric disorders . . . .”); Talge et al., supra note 
243, at 245 (prenatal stress can lead to ADHD, anxiety, and language delay). 
 271 See, e.g., Nelkin, supra note 156, at 2121 (“[C]ourts in the 1980s frequently 
allowed brain images from Positron Emission Tomography (‘PET’) scans to enter into 
sentencing decisions.”); Baum, supra note 153, at 287 (genetic variant was tested and 
shown to exist at the time of sentencing). 
 272 St-Pierre et al., supra note 244, at 70 (emphasis added); see also Talge et al., supra 
note 243, at 251 (longitudinal study of women who were pregnant during a devastating 
flood or the German invasion of the Netherlands had children with a higher risk of 
developing schizophrenia). 
 273 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308–09 (2002) (forensic psychologist testified 
at sentencing about defendant’s mild mental retardation and low IQ). 
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collected by the probation officer in creating the presentence report.274  
Because a judge must accept the undisputed parts of the report as 
findings of fact and it is generally scientifically accepted that ACEs have 
a significant impact on adult criminal behavior, it is relatively easy to 
present ACEs for consideration at sentencing.  Conversely, 
neuroimaging, genetic evidence, and expert testimony can cost upwards 
of $50,000.275  When neither a defendant nor the government can afford 
to foot such a bill to definitively show the current neurological or genetic 
state of a defendant, ACEs are a useful alternative.  This argument 
theoretically applies to fetal trauma, but it is much more difficult to 
collect reliable information about instances of fetal trauma than ACEs.  
Interviews conducted by the probation officer and records obtained 
from schools, doctors, and hospitals lend themselves to the discovery of 
a defendant’s experience with ACEs.  A defendant cannot even speak to 
their own experience of fetal trauma.  Furthermore, because the 
research has not yet demonstrated a strong enough connection between 
fetal trauma and criminal behavior, it would not be as reliable to use 
fetal trauma without present evaluation.  
Lastly, critics may argue that fetal trauma should be taken into 
account for a defendant who: (1) only experienced such extreme fetal 
trauma that it altered him substantially and permanently; (2) never 
suffered ACEs during his upbringing; and (3) the lasting effects are not 
observable, non-diagnosable, or would be too expensive for a defendant 
to present at sentencing.  Even this improbable scenario fails, however, 
because judges should avoid getting sucked into a black hole of genetic 
heritability. 
D.  Genetic Heritability 
Epigenetics is an ever-expanding field of study.  While this 
Comment focused on epigenetic alterations that can occur in one’s 
lifetime, there is a growing body of research studying epigenetic 
alterations that occur in parents before they even conceive and how 
they could get passed down to their children and beyond.276  This 
intergenerational transmission may allow a parent’s ACEs to one day 
impact their child’s fetal development.277  Judges would get tangled up 
in a defendant’s heritage of suffering.  Where would judges draw the 
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line?  Would they consider a parent’s experiences during the Jim Crow 
era, a grandparent’s experiences during the Holocaust, a great-
grandparent’s experiences during World War I? 
Venturing down this path would also implicate questions of free 
will and determinism.  If we can trace the cause of our actions to 
suffering that occurred before we were even a thought, what does that 
do to our understanding of culpability?  In the grand scheme of life, 
stressors and environmental factors can only change so much—there is 
a codependent factor, which is a person’s innate personal 
characteristics that can moderate or exacerbate the effect of 
environmental insults.278  At the same time, it is important for the 
maturation of our society that we recognize that not all defendants are 
the same.  A balance needs to be struck, and considering fetal trauma at 
sentencing goes far afield and upsets that balance.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Case law, standards, public morals and values, and even the 
Guidelines all suggest that a sentencing judge could consider evidence 
of a defendant’s traumatic experience during gestation.  But judges 
should not.  There are not enough longitudinal, observational studies on 
people who experienced fetal trauma and their disposition to violent or 
criminal behavior.  Yet even in a world brimming with such research, 
there is so much opportunity for trauma to a fetus—from substance 
abuse to socioeconomic stressors to physical trauma—that a judge 
would be hard-pressed to draw the line between what degree of fetal 
trauma should be considered and what should not.  Furthermore, 
research indicates that since these changes are epigenetic, positive 
experiences during childhood might repair any prenatal changes from 
trauma—and those that are irreparable manifest as observable or 
diagnosable issues in adults and are discernible at sentencing.  Courts 
should avoid the world of genetic heritability, stop at considering ACEs, 
and look no further into a defendant’s past. 
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